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Abstract
We revisit the problem of counting the number of distinct elements F0(D) in a data
stream D, over a domain [u]. We propose an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm
that approximates F0(D) within a factor of (1 ± γ), and with additive error of
O(
√
ln(1/δ)/ε), using space O(ln(ln(u)/γ)/γ2). We improve on the prior work
at least quadratically and up to exponentially, in terms of both space and additive
error. Our additive error guarantee is optimal up to a factor of O(
√
ln(1/δ)),












assume the existence of an ideal uniform random hash function, and ignore the
space required to store it. We later relax this requirement by assuming pseudo-
random functions and appealing to a computational variant of differential privacy,
SIM-CDP.
Our algorithm is built on top of the celebrated Flajolet-Martin (FM) sketch.
We show that FM-sketch is differentially private as is, as long as there are
≈
√
ln(1/δ)/(εγ) distinct elements in the data set. Along the way, we prove
a structural result showing that the maximum of k i.i.d. random variables is statisti-
cally close (in the sense of ε-differential privacy) to the maximum of (k + 1) i.i.d.






Finally, experiments show that our algorithms introduces error within an order
of magnitude of the non-private analogues for streams with thousands of distinct
elements, even while providing strong privacy guarantee (ε ≤ 1).
1 Introduction
Counting distinct elements in a data stream (a.k.a. cardinality estimation) is one of the fundamental
problems in streaming computation [10]. The simplest algorithm would just keep track of the set
of distinct elements in the stream. This requires space that grows linearly with the set’s cardinality,
making it infeasible to be deployed at scale. For example, one might want to count the number of
distinct search queries on google.com [25], or the number of unique users who clicked on an
advertisement campaign [43]. For such large streams, one would like to count distinct elements
approximately using a very small amount of additional space—perhaps just a few kilobytes [1].
Beyond web applications, counting distinct elements is an essential component in many other
fields, such as computational biology [9, 4], graph analysis [38, 37], query optimization [40, 39],
datamining [42, 3, 25, 35], and network traffic monitoring [19].
There has been a tremendous amount of work both on the theoretical front (see [29] for a brief survey),
and on the applied front [31, 24, 2] on cardinality estimation. Variants of the classic Flajolet-Martin
(FM) sketch [21] are theoretically optimal [29] and achieve the best known empirical space-accuracy
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trade-offs [25, 20]. The accuracy of cardinality estimation algorithms is typically measured by their
multiplicative error. The algorithm with the best known theoretical bound estimates the true distinct
count up to a multiplicative factor of (1±γ), with space O(1/γ2 + ln ln(u)) [29], where u is the size
of the universe from which data elements are drawn (or simply an upper bound on the stream length).
Desfontaines et al. [13] showed that a large class of sketches used to count distinct elements allow an
attacker to test whether a particular individual is in the stream (a type of attack called “tracing” [17]
or “membership inference” [41]). Designing sketch algorithms that do not reveal individual-level
information thus requires considerable care.
In this paper, we give new differentially private algorithms for counting distinct elements. While there
has been prior work on this problem [32, 36, 5], their space-utility trade-offs are exponentially worse
(in the universe size u) than that of non-private variants. We bridge this gap by achieving (nearly)
optimal space-utility trade-off, assuming the existence of an ideal uniform random hash function
(sometimes called a “random oracle” [29]). This assumption can be removed at some additional space
cost. Our algorithm is (ε, δ)-differentially private and uses space O(ln(ln(u)/γ)/γ2) to estimate
cardinality up to multiplicative factor of (1 ± γ) with an additive error of O(
√
ln(1/δ)/ε). The
additive error is optimal up to a factor of
√
ln(1/δ) for any differentially private algorithm that counts
the number of distinct elements in a data set, even without space constraints.
One main advantage of our algorithm is its simplicity. We show that if one has at least
≈
√
ln(1/δ)/(εγ)-distinct elements in the data stream, then the original FM sketch [21, 14] is
differentially private as is, assuming hash values for different elements are independent. We guaran-
tee this condition by padding the stream with enough new, “phantom" elements.
Problem definition: Let D = [d1, . . . , dn] be a stream of data samples where each di is from a
domain [u]. The objective is to estimate the number of distinct elements in D, denoted F0(D). The
algorithm A is given privacy parameters ε and δ as well as a space bound S. When the data stream
has been read completely, it produces a final output A(D). A must satisfy (ε, δ)-differential privacy
(Definition 1.1). We say that the algorithm A has multiplicative error γ and additive error A with
failure probability β if, for every data stream D, with probability at least 1 − β over A’s random
coins, the output A(D) satisfies F0(D)(1+γ) −A ≤ A(D) ≤ (1 + γ)F0(D) +A, sometimes abbreviated
A(D) ∈ (1± γ)F0(D)±A .
When β is not specified, we take it to be 1/3. Non-private algorithms [10] typically guarantee A = 0.
However, differentially private cardinality estimators must have additive error A = Ω (1/ε), even
without a space constraint.
Definition 1.1 (Differential privacy [16, 15]). A randomized algorithm A is (ε, δ)-differentially
private if for any pair of data sets D and D′ that differ in one record (i.e., |D4D′| = 1), and for all
S in the output range of A, we have
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eε ·Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ,
where the probability is over the randomness of A.
Typically, ε is taken to be a small constant, say 0.1, and δ is a small quantity that captures the
probability of a significant privacy leak (often it is chosen smaller than 1/n [30]).
Our Contributions: In Section 2, we provide an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm (Algorithm 3)
that achieves additive error of O(
√
ln(1/δ)/ε) using O(ln(ln(u)/γ)/γ2) bits of space. A variant
of the algorithm is (ε, 0)-differentially private, but has additive error O(1/γε). These algorithms
improve significantly on previous work, which had additive error and space bounds that (a) grow
polynomially in ln(u) rather than ln ln(u) and (b) have additive error at least ln(u)/(ε2γ2)—worse
than ours by at least a quadratic factor, even for small universes. Table 1 provides a brief comparison;
see Appendix A for more related work.
To ensure differential privacy, Algorithm 3 requires access to an ideal random hash function mapping
[u]× [m] to N+, where m is (roughly) the space usage of the sketch, each hash value is geometrically
distributed with parameter γ/(1 + γ) and hash values are independent (Assumption 2.1). In the
above space bound, we do not consider the space required to store the seed to the hash function.
Section 2.3 explains how to practically emulate such hash functions with a single pseudorandom
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Table 1: Comparison between various differentially private algorithms for estimating the number
of distinct elements (F0(D)) up to a multiplicative factor of (1 ± γ) for γ ≤ 1. c∗ denotes the
maximum count for each element. The comparison ignores the space to store the hash function seed,
and assumes compute time for hashing any element x ∈ [u] is O(1). (†) Privacy guarantee in [12]
is conditioned on F0(D) being large enough. We analyzed a variant of it with “phantom” elements
added to ensure the condition. [12] did not have any accuracy guarantees. (∗) The algorithm of [32]
can be modified to satisfy “pan-privacy" (that is, they remain private even when an attacker sees the
algorithm’s internal state at one point in time).
Algorithm Privacy Additive error Space Ideal uniform Time (per update)
hash function
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functions (PRF) [44]. Generically, this approach results in a weakening of the differential privacy
definition to a computational variant, SIM-CDP [33]. In fact, sufficiently strong PRFs allow us
to achieve actual differential privacy, though they still require a complexity-theoretic assumption
(their existence implies that of one-way functions). In practice, the space required to store the hash
functions is not significant: it suffices store a seed of one PRF, e.g., a block cipher like AES whose
seed is at most 256 bits. See Section 2.3 for details.
The privacy-space-utility trade-off our algorithm offers is (almost) tight. Every differentially private
algorithm for counting distinct elements has an additive error of Ω(1/ε) (by the optimality of the
geometric mechanism [23]). Every algorithm, private or not, requires space Ω(1/γ2) [28]. Relative
to prior work on private low-space counting [36, 32], our algorithm reduces both the additive error
and space requirement exponentially in the dependence on the domain size u. (That said, our use of a
pseudorandom function makes the privacy guarantees incomparable.)
Algorithm 3 is based on the celebrated FM sketch [26, 21, 14, 20], described formally in Algorithm 1.
The idea is to map each distinct element of the stream to a geometric random variable, so that
repeated elements map to the same value. One stores the maximum observed value of all the random
variables. This value is an integer α such that the true cardinality F0(D) lies in [(1+γ)α, (1+γ)α+1]
with reasonable probability. This “basic unit” is repeated about 1/γ2 times in parallel to get a
high-confidence estimate. We show that, roughly,




distinct elements in the data stream.
To be exact, we also need to impose a lower bound on each of the stored maximum hash values.
That bound is small enough that it does not affect accuracy. We can get an algorithm that is truly
differentially private by adding kp “phantom” elements (guaranteed to be not in the data set) to the
sketch before processing the data, and subtracting kp from the final estimate. This step guarantees
enough distinct elements for the privacy guarantee to kick in.
Our analysis relies on a structural result, Lemma 2.3, which might be of independent interest: The
maximum of k i.i.d. Uniform (0, 1) random variables, when lower bounded by e−ε, is ε-close (in






. This allows us to show that each “basic unit" of the FM sketch is (ε, 0)-differentially
private as long as the data stream has at least (roughly) 1/ε distinct elements. The privacy of the
entire sketch follows by standard composition results.
The idea that certain sketching algorithms are already differentially private is not new to this paper.
Blocki et al. [8] showed that the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform (commonly used for dimensionality
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reduction) is also differentially private. Our results suggests a potentially more general connection.
In a recent concurrent work, Choi et al. [12] made a similar observation that FM sketch preserves
differential privacy as is. However, their privacy guarantee is conditioned on the fact that there are
sufficient number of distinct elements in the data stream. Using our idea of explicitly adding phantom
elements, one can make the privacy guarantee in [12] unconditional. The additive error is hard to
estimate unless F0(D) is really large. This is due to splitting of the data stream in [12]. However,
according to the variance guarantees of these style of estimators [20], one cannot expect the additive
error to be any better than O(1/(εγ)). While the privacy analysis in [12] is only for geometric
distribution, our privacy argument is more general: it applies to any distribution over the reals.
Experiments: One important attribute of our algorithm is that the entire final value of the sketch—
including all 1/γ2 “basic units” but not the hash function descriptions—is differentially private. This
means an analyst could use any function to convert these basic units into a final cardinality estimate.
In Algorithm 3, we use the quantile estimator, whose performance is simplest to analyse. However,
one can use other estimators, e.g., the geometric [14] or harmonic means [20]. In our empirical
evaluation, we compare these estimators on the private and the non-private variant of FM sketch. The
harmonic mean (corresponding to the Hyper-log-log sketch) is most commonly used in practice [25].
In Section 3, we show that with ε = 1.0, all three estimators reach nearly the same relative error as
the non-private estimator, which is below 2% using 4096 hash functions. Comparing the estimators,
we can see that the harmonic mean generally performs best, though for streams with few distinct
elements the quantile estimator is more accurate. We further compare our empirical results with prior
(and concurrent) works [36, 12, 32]. We demonstrate that our algorithm has a superior empirical
performance in practice too.
2 Counting Distinct Elements Privately
In this section, we provide an (ε, δ)-differentially private streaming algorithm that estimates F0(D),
the number of distinct elements inD, with multiplicate error 1±γ and additive errorO(
√
ln(1/δ)/ε)







In Section 2.1, we first revisit the FM sketch. Then, in Section 2.2 we provide a differentially private
variant of the FM sketch. The algorithms in this section are built assuming the existence of ideal
uniform random hash functions. In Section 2.3, we provide the details on practical implementation
using pseudorandom functions.
2.1 Revisiting Flajolet-Martin Sketch
For completeness, we first recall a variant of the Flajolet-Martin (FM) sketch [21, 14, 20]. We will use
Algorithm AFM (Algorithm 1) as a building block in our differentially private estimation algorithm.






. Then (1 + γ)α ∈
[
k
(1+γ) , k · (1 + γ)
]
with reasonable probability.
More specifically, the probability that (1 + γ)α lies to the left of the interval is about 1/e− γ; the
probability that it lies to the right is roughly 1/e + γ. Hence, if there are k-distinct elements in a
data stream, and each distinct element is assigned an independent geometric r.v., then the maximum
of these r.v.s can be used to estimate k within a multiplicative factor of (1 + γ). The probability of
success can be boosted by running multiple independent copies of this procedure, and taking the
1/e-th quantile of these maxima as the final estimator. The original FM-sketch [21] is an instantiation
of Algorithm AFM with γ = 1 and using the artihmetic mean, rather than a quantile, of the maxima
to get the final estimator.
Our version of AlgorithmAFM relies on the existence of an idealized geometric hash function defined
in Assumption 2.1. (We discuss more realistic hash functions in Section 2.3.)
1For p ∈ (0, 1], Geometric (p) denotes the discrete distribution with CDF F (w) = 1 − (1 − p)w for
w ∈ N+.
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Algorithm 1 AFM: Flajolet-Martin (FM) sketch for distinct elements
Input: Data set: D = {d1, . . . , dn}, domain: [u], accuracy constraint: γ ∈ (0, 1), Hash






s ∼ Uniform (S)
1: s← Uniform (S) {sample a random seed for the hash function}, α← 0
2: for i← 1 to n do
3: Yi ← Hs(di), α← max(α, Yi)
4: end for
5: return α
Assumption 2.1. We say H : S × [u] → N+ is an ideal geometric-valued hash function (with
parameter γ1+γ ) if, for every finite set of distinct inputs x1, ..., x`, if s ∼ Uniform (S), the values






Theorem 2.2 (Utility guarantee of the non-private FM sketch). Consider an input stream D ∈ [u]∗
with F0(D) distinct elements. Let {α1, . . . , αm} denote the values returned by m independent












γ2 , then with probability at least 1− β,
F0(D)
(1 + γ)




2.2 Differentially Private Flajolet-Martin Sketch
Algorithms 2 and 3 specify a differentially private variant of the Flajolet-Martin (FM) sketch, where
Algorithm 2 is the sketch itself, and Algorithm 3 is the estimator.
The privacy guarantee comes from a proof that the non-private sketch as is satisfies differential




distinct elements in the data stream, and the
value of the sketch is bounded below by a specific constant.
In a bit more detail: The FM sketch (in Algorithm 1) can be thought of as the maximum of F0(D)
geometric random variables. We make two key observations, Lemma 2.3 and Corollary 2.4, which
may be of independent interest. Lemma 2.3 shows that the maximum of k i.i.d. Uniform (0, 1), when
lower bounded by e−ε, is statistically close to the maximum of (k + 1) i.i.d. Uniform (0, 1), as long
as k ≥ 1eε−1 ≈
1
ε . Corollary 2.4 extends the guarantee to maximum of geometric random variables,
with a lower bound of roughly log(1/ε) instead of 1/ε.
In order to be able to apply Corollary 2.4 and get a differentially private sketch, we make two changes.
First, since Corollary 2.4 requires k ≥ 1eε−1 , we add kp =
1
eε−1 “phantom” elements (in Line 2)
to the maximum. One may think of these as imaginary elements that do not overlap with D. We
subtract kp from the final estimate to account for these new elements. Second, we enforce the lower
bound (denoted αmin) when the sketch is finalized.
The space requirement of the resulting algorithm is the same as the non-private sketch. The utility
analysis follows almost directly from the utility of the nonprivate estimator. Adding the phantom
elements (and later subtracting them from the estimate) does not affect the multiplicative error, but
does induce some extra additive error.
For any two random variables W1 an W2 with the same range space R, we say W1 ≈ε W2, or
W1 is ε-statistically close to W2, if e−εPr [W2 ∈ S] ≤ Pr [W1 ∈ S] ≤ eεPr [W2 ∈ S] for all
measurable sets S ⊆ R. We now state Lemma 2.3 and Corollary 2.4. (See Appendix B.2 for the
proof of Corollary 2.4.)
Lemma 2.3. Let Z1, . . . , Zk+1 be independent random variables where each Zi ∼ Uniform (0, 1).
Let W1 = max {Z1, . . . , Zk, b} and W2 = max {Z1, . . . , Zk+1, b}. For any ε, if k ≥ 1eε−1 and
b ≥ e−ε, then W1 ≈ε W2.
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Algorithm 2 ADP-FM-Differentially private Flajolet-Martin (FM) sketch





























for ` ∈ [kp]
3: αD ← AFM (D, [u], γ).
4: return α = max (αD, αp, αmin) {N.B.: The seed of the hash function is not output.}
Algorithm 3 ADP-Estimator: Differentially private distinct elements estimator
Input: Data set: D = {d1, · · · , dn}, domain: [u], accuracy constraint: γ ∈ (0, 1), privacy
parameters: (ε, δ), number of runs: m {N.B.: Our utility analysis requires m ≈ 1/γ2.}




, Apriv ← 0m
2: for j ∈ [m] do









-th quantile of Apriv
)





Proof. The distributions of W1 and W2 are both supported on [b, 1]. They have nonzero probability
mass at the value b, and a continuous densities, which we will denote f1 and f2 on the interval (b, 1].
To show thatW1 ≈ε W2, it is sufficient to show that Pr(W2=b)Pr(W1=b) ∈ [e
−ε, eε], and that f2(w)f1(w) ∈ [e
−ε, eε]
for all w ∈ (b, 1).
Let W ′1 = max {Zi : i ∈ [k]} and W ′2 = max {Zi : i ∈ [k + 1]}. That is, W ′1 and W ′2 are the
maximum of k and k + 1 independent uniform random variables (without the maximum with b).
Since the Zi’s are independent and uniform, the CDF of W ′1 is F2(w) = w
k and the CDF of W ′2 is
F1(w) = w
k+1 for w ∈ [0, 1].









= b ∈ [e−ε, 1].
















Recall that k is chosen so that 1 + 1k = e
ε, and w lies in [e−ε, 1]. The ratio of densities thus lies in
[1, eε], as desired.
This lemma in fact applies to essentially any distribution over the real numbers, as long as the lower
bound is chosen to lie above the e−ε-quantile of the distribution. We consider geometric distribution
with support N+, which is the distribution of times one flips a coin with a specific bias until one
“heads" is observed. We get the following corollary:
Corollary 2.4. Let Ẑ1, . . . , Ẑk+1 be independent random variables where each Ẑi ∼ Geometric (p).
Let Ŵ1 = max
{
Ẑ1, . . . , Ẑk, b̂
}
and Ŵ2 = max
{
Ẑ1, . . . , Ẑk+1, b̂
}







, then Ŵ1 ≈ε Ŵ2.
Theorem 2.5. If H satisfies Assumption 2.1, then ADP-FM (Algorithm 2) is (ε′, 0)-differentially
private, and ADP-Estimator (Algorithm 3) is (ε, δ)-differentially private as long as ε ≤ 2 ln(1/δ).
Proof. We will first prove the privacy guarantee for ADP-FM and then compose over m runs to get
the guarantee for ADP-Estimator.
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. Therefore, the output of ADP-FM(D, [u], γ, ε′), max (αD, αp, αmin), follows
the same distribution as max
{
Y1, . . . , YF0(D)+kp , αmin
}






Consider neighboring data sets D and D′. Without loss of generality, we assume F0(D′) = F0(D) +






, according to Corollary 2.4, we
have ADP-FM(D, [u], γ, ε′) ≈ε′ ADP-FM(D′, [u], γ, ε′). Therefore, ADP-FM guarantees ε′-differential





-RDP for ζ ≥ 1.
Now, we compose over j ∈ [m] and have that publishing Apriv in ADP-Estimator guarantees
(ζ, 2ζm (ε′)
2
)-RDP. We can translate it to (ε2, δ)-differential privacy with ε2 = 2ζm (ε′)
2
+ log(1/δ)ζ−1 .



















and have, ε2 = 2ζm (ε′)
2
+ log(1/δ)ζ−1 ≤ 2ζm (ε
′)
2
+ 2 log(1/δ)ζ = 4ε
′
√
mlog(1/δ) = ε. This com-
pletes the proof.
In the following, we provide the utility guarantee for our private FM sketch. The proof goes via a
reduction to the nonprivate algorithm (Theorem 2.2). To do so, we show that the lower bound of αmin
(in Algorithm 2) does not interfere with the quantile estimator. (See Appendix B.3 for the proof.)
Theorem 2.6 (Utility guarantee of the private FM). Suppose γ, ε, δ, β ∈ (0, 1). Let kpriv be the output
of Algorithm 3 with inputs γ, ε, δ, using m = 100
√
ln(1/β)
γ2 . Suppose H satisfies Assumption 2.1. For














where F0(D) is the number of distinct elements in D.
An (ε, 0)-DP variant: One can obtain an ε-differential privacy guarantee (with δ = 0) for Algo-
rithm 3 by setting ε′ = ε/m in Line 1, and using standard composition in Theorem 2.5. The additive
error in Theorem 2.6 correspondingly becomes O(1/(εγ)).
Implementation details: In Algorithm 1 (and consequently in its differentially private variant),
we used ideal geometric-valued hash functions, the hash values can potentially be arbitrarily large
numbers in N+. Since we are guaranteed to have at most u distinct elements, the utility guarantees
in Theorems 2.2 and 2.6 will not be affected if we truncate the range of the hash functions to
dlog(1+γ)(u)e. In Section 2.3, we provide more details on constructing these hash functions.
Theorem 2.7 (Space complexity). Let τ be the space required to store the seed for each of the hash
functions H1, . . . ,Hm corresponding to the m i.i.d. instances of the Algorithm 1 (AFM) spawned by
Algorithm 3 (ADP-Estimator). Following the setting of Theorem 2.6, the overall space requirement for












instances of Algorithm AFM spawned by Algorithm





= O (ln(ln(u)/γ)). This completes the proof.
The per-record update time for Algorithm ADP-Estimator is m = O(
√
ln(1/β)/γ2) assuming that
hash evaluations take constant time, since each of the m sketches must be updated.
2.3 From Ideal Hashing to Pseudorandom Functions
Our algorithms are described in terms of ideal hash functions, but such functions are prohibitively
expensive in both space and time to simulate exactly. We therefore consider their simulation using
cryptographic pseudorandom functions (PRFs). (See definition below.)
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We first note that it is straightforward to convert hash functions that output uniformly random bit
strings to the geometric distributions needed using standard sampling techniques. Specifically,
given a uniform random value in A ∈ [0, 1], we can exactly sample B ∼ Geometric (p) by setting
B = dln1−p(A)e = dln1/(1−p)(1/A)e. If we are instead given A′ which is uniform in [2`], then B =
dln1/(1−p)(2`/A′)e approximates the correct distribution up to total variation distance O( `p · 2
−`).
Cryptographic PRFs: Given a security parameter κ and desired input and output lengths `in and
`out, a pseudorandom function is an efficiently computable map F : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}`in → {0, 1}`out .
The first input, called the seed or key, specifies a curried function Fs(·) = F (s, ·). A PRF is (t, µ)-
pseudorandom if a circuit with size at most t has advantage at most µ over random guessing when
attempting to distinguish an oracle computing Fs(·), where s is a uniform seed in {0, 1}κ, from a
uniformly random function from {0, 1}`in to {0, 1}`out .
If we fix an injection from [u] × [m] to `in, and an algorithm for sampling from (a distribution
sufficiently close to) Geometric (p) from a uniform string in {0, 1}`out , we can use a single (t, µ)-PRF
in place of the m ideal hash functions to execute Algorithm 3. The resulting algorithm will be
indistinguishable from the original to an observer implemented by a circuit of size at most t − v,
where v is the complexity of running the original algorithm (roughly n ·m ln(log(1+γ)(u))). The
final algorithm will thus satisfy (t−v, µ, ε, δ)-SIM-CDP [33] (meaning that a time t−v distinguisher
will have advantage at most µ in distinguishing it from an algorithm that is actually (ε, δ)-DP).
Because the output of the algorithm can be written in at most log2(log(1+γ)(u)) bits, one can actually
cap the complexity of the distinguisher at roughly tmax = v + O(ln(u)/γ), and achieve actual
(ε, δ + µ)-differential privacy when the PRF is sufficiently powerful (i.e. for t > tmax).
All this relies on the existence of a sufficiently good PRF. In theory, (families of) PRFs secure
against polynomial-time adversaries are equivalent to the existence of one-way functions. Assuming
exponentially hard pseudorandom generators, one can get actual differential privacy with a hash
function seed of length O(log tmax + log(1/µ)) = O(log n+ logm+ log(u) + log(1/δ)) (setting
µ = δ). In practice, block ciphers like AES are widely accepted to have PRF properties [7], and
hence can be used as an instantiation of the PRFs.
Explicit hash functions and PRGs for space-bounded computation: The above discussion high-
lights that one need not handle arbitrary distinguishers to get an explicit version of our result. It is
entirely possible that a much simpler notion of pseudorandomness, such as t-wise independence,
suffices for proving privacy in this setting. One promising direction, which we do not develop here, is
to adapt Nisan’s pseudorandom generator for space-bounded distinguishers [34] to our setting. Indyk
[27] showed that a natural class of streaming estimators can be derandomized using this approach;
we are not aware of a similar result that encompasses the algorithms discussed here.
3 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we present simulation results on our private FM-sketch (Algorithms 2 and 3) and
comparison to prior work [12, 36, 32]. We provide more evaluations results in Appendix D and E.
In Theorem 2.5, we show that releasingApriv in Algorithm 3 guarantees differential privacy. Therefore,
even if our utility analysis is for quantile estimator in Line 5 of Algorithm 3, we can use any other
estimator as long as it is post-processing of Apriv. In the empirical evaluation, we consider two other
popular estimators, the geometric mean [14] and harmonic mean [25] of {(1 + γ)α : α ∈ Apriv}. We
refer to the estimators as Geometric, Harmonic, and Quantile. We note that we do not split the data
stream as was done in [14, 25] since our tight utility/privacy/space trade-offs are for the non-splitting
version. However, in our implementation of the prior (and contemporary) work [12, 36, 32], we do
split the data streams as mentioned in the corresponding papers. Additionally, we apply standard
nearest neighbor debiasing as in [25] to all algorithms. Details of the debiasing algorithm can be
found in Appendix C.
Setting: We consider datasets with true cardinality F0(D) ranging approximately from 212 to
220 ≈ 106. We run our algorithm and estimate the cardinality with all three estimators mentioned
above. The utility is measured by the mean relative error (MRE), i.e, |kpriv − F0(D)|/F0(D). We
run 100 simulations for each configuration and plot the mean and standard deviation of the MRE.
8

































































(b) ε = 1.0
Figure 1: From left to right, Quantile (γ = 0.01), Geometric (γ = 1.0), and Harmonic (γ = 1.0).
With debiasing.































Ours Ours (pure DP) [12] with phantom [36] [32] (non-private)
(a) Non-private. (b) ε = 1.0. (c) ε = 0.1.
Figure 2: Comparison with previous work. For our methods and [12], we use Harmonic with γ = 0.01
(as γ = 1.0 is not as stable for [12]). For our methods, [12] and [36], we use m = 4096. For [32],
we only present the non-private result.
In Figure 1, we compare the non-private and private (with (ε, δ) = (1.0, 10−9)) MRE, under
m = 1024, 4096 and 32768. For Geometric and Harmonic, we set γ = 1.0 which corresponds to the
setting of the FM-sketches in [14, 25]. On the other hand, as Quantile takes the quantile of Apriv and
the final estimation is a power of (1 + γ), larger γ can introduce a quite significant bias as compared
to the other two estimators. We thus use γ = 0.01 for Quantile. Notice that we choose the value of
m independently from γ, and thus the three estimators has the same space and time requirement.
Results for our algorithm: Comparing Figure 1a and 1b, for all three estimators, with ε = 1.0,
we can reach roughly the same utility as that of non-private estimation, especially when the actual
cardinality is large. Comparing the estimators, we can see that Harmonic usually performs better,
and for small F0(D) with large m, Quantile performs better. With m = 4096, the MRE is at most
2% for all of them. In general, MRE decreases as m grows, i.e., we achieve higher utility at the cost
of increased space and update time.
Comparison with [12, 36, 32]: We also provide empirical comparisons with related works. As
noted in the work itself, the algorithm in [32] requires a computationally expensive noise sampling
step. We therefore only conduct simulation of their non-private correspondence [10, Algorithm 13],
and demonstrate that it does not perform better than our private algorithm. For our algorithm, we
use the Harmonic estimator as it usually performs the best. As the related works guarantee pure
differential privacy, we also run the pure differentially private variant of our algorithm as described
in Section 2.2. Figure 2 shows the results for non-private, ε = 1.0 and 0.1 for all algorithms with
empirical debiasing.
We can see that our algorithm under (1.0, 10−9)-differential privacy outperforms the non-private
correspondence of [32]. Our algorithm with δ = 0 has smaller error than both [12] and [36], especially
for relatively small cardinality. More details and results can be found in Appendix E.
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Broader Impact
Counting distinct elements with space constraints is one of the fundamental problems encountered in
web-scale systems [1, 2]. As more organizations attempt to adopt differential privacy in their data
processing pipeline (e.g., Apple, Google, Facebook, and US Census), having a practical differentially
private cardinality estimator is becoming all the more important. Furthermore, [13] showed that many
non-private estimators can leak “significant” sensitive information about individuals. Hence, we
believe our differentially private solution will help control the information leakage about individuals
through cardinality estimation sketches. We hope that reducing leakage enables better security and
more responsible data management overall; the simplicity of our algorithm means that its adoption
need not be limited to highly sophisticated organizations.
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